pyrrho's Journal: Beyond Good and Evil: aphorism 4

Here Neitzsche gives us an explanation of what "beyond good and evil" means. By example, the truth that falsety is indespensible, for example synthetic a priori judgements. These would at least include mathematical truths.

As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain, as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. -- Albert Einstein

This is the falsification that Neitzsche points out. It's beyond good and evil, meaning it's neither of these things. The fact that the deception is useful is just something to notice like any other fact or facet of the world.

The careful traditionalist will possibly detect this as an attempt to undermine the foundations upon which a lot of other anti-falsehood ethics are based, namely the idea that a universal rule could be used. If we accept this case, what will happen in the future when we consider "is it wrong to lie?" Should we dare really open an issue that even leads to such questions. What if we end up justifying lying. What if we prove a philosophic justification, a blank check for misrepresentation and all forms of fraud? Should we lead ourselves onto paths that lead to the question "is to tell falsehood wrong?"

We all know that a liar does indeed (try to) justify his lie allong the lines of self preservation. Nietzche brings up an abstract case I find interesting and fundamental, just as he offered it. But a wide subtext is also set, "what is the value of truth?" relates to "what is the value of a lie?" The question is continuous from the abstract cases of little interest to most people to everyday affairs which affect people in their real lives and are of great concern.

Nietzsche may, at this point, intend to use this as a fient, to justify truth somehow with a quick dodge back on track, like one would expect of a Descartes or Kant, raising these doubts or casting asside old systems in order to rejustify conclusions identical to those of the preceding moral systems.

I think Nietzsche is promising something more honest. He's promising to give an answer that really is just simply beyond good and evil. Good and evil are just concepts that won't be involved, that's all.

The title sounds somewhat challenging even in today's world when it's not particularly shocking anymore. It still comes across as clearly trying to be contrarian and iconoclastic. In a world where people declare their bad values proudly in some cases, maybe this isn't so shocking in itself.

Neitzsche did intend it to be iconoclastic and in his day it was easy to spot as a near declaration of philosophic war. However, Nietzsche also meant something simple and literal.
The analysis in the work is not about good and evil. Good and evil won't be in the answers offered. He's going to use a new set of tools. Not beyond in the sense of deeper than, just chronologically beyond.
He won't be coming back later to show that The Truth really is The Good after all. He may offer instead an alternate way to address and understand the issues involved. He may suggest we find our own different ways.

This sounds promising to me, and is certain what's attractive to me in Nietzsche's work. It promises better than rejustification. It sounds better than new lists of what -is- good. An honest to goodness new angle.
I'm into a better way than good vs. evil to look at things. The good to evil gradient (greyscale instead of black and white) is not really much more satisfying. Could Nietzche be promising us color vision?

Colors

[christalyss]

Not sure how to respond to most of this, I think I'll wait for the next installment to give an analysis.

When Saruman told Gandalf that he was changing his name to "Saruman of Many Colors" Gandalf replied, "he who breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom."

Not sure how this relates, I'll have to think about it, but it popped into my head.

deception

[pyrrho]

It's also worth noting that the falsifications are no doubt redeemable.

That is, by admitting the falsifications you turn them into "approximations". By acknowledging what is going on, you are making use of tools, not lying about knowledge.

In the practical and real world, this is a no-brainer, it's already happened and happening. However, in the world of philsophy, where we explain this kind of thing and try to underpin human knowledge, it's meaning, and it's interpretations, we are still, I think, stuck