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Duhh... (5, Funny)

The Iconoclast (24795) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425824)

One can only wonder what the FBI will do.
Why, outlaw quantum mechanics, of course!

Re:Duhh... (1)

limbostar (116177) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425835)

You beat me to it. But actually, the FBI can't outlaw anything, they can only push the legislature to outlaw it, and then they could enforce that law.

Nevertheless, I wonder what implications this will have for privacy, assuming this is feasable enough to become widespread.

Re:Duhh... (-1, Offtopic)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425938)

Yew eat me two eet. Butt auctex-ually, the GCJ kin outlow eenytheeing, thay kin awnly poosh the ledge-is-lay-ture two outlow eet, and then thay would awnfarce thet laww.

Re:Duhh... (2)

56ker (566853) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425897)

No they'll just insist the fundamental laws of physics are changed to make it insecure enough for the FBI to decode everything - but nobody else. Remember the whole key escrow debate - there'll probably be a similar sort of one about quantum crypto too.

nope, no need! (1, Informative)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425920)

What this means is that the message can only be read once, not that the message is impossible to decrypt. The government still has the same job it's always had.

Plus the distances involved are microscopic. For this to matter much to the government the single quanta of data has to last long enough to travel a significant distance.

key, not message (3, Interesting)

Skavookie (3659) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426071)

Quantum crypto allows Allice to send a one time pad to Bob and determine if it was intercepted or not. If it is intercepted then Allice discards the pad and tries again. Otherwise Allice uses the pad to encrypt the message and uses conventional means to transmit it. If someone intercepts the pad, then the message is never sent so there's nothing to cryptanalyze. Otherwise they have a message but no pad. Cryptanalysis of a message encrypted with a one time pad is mathematically impossible.

The distance issue is the main problem with this technology but progress is being made on that front and I'm sure it will only be a matter of time before it is solved.

Re:Duhh... (1)

vitalidea (571366) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425986)

One can only wonder what the FBI will do.

probably the same thing they've always done... intercept the transmission after it's been recieved (or in some cases before its been sent).

there is no such thing as fbi-proof. the message has to be decrypted at some point, otherwise, it isn't a very useful communication, is it?

Re:Duhh... (1)

gibbdog (551209) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426050)

Very good point... Why waste time and money trying to decrypt something when you can buy someone out a lot cheaper and get the info from them after the decryption is done...

Quanta! (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425825)

My quantum computer is going to show both Intel and AMD who's boss!

They won't know why to do with their piddly little silicon processors after they experience the speed at which my quantum computer will work.

Now I find out that I will be able to send encrypted messages that not even the FBI and intercept. Gotta love quantum theory!

First Reply to Second Post! (-1, Troll)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425976)

This reply to second post is dedicated to OSM!

by osm

Rob Malda has barely made any effort to fully describe the process of selecting Slashdot moderators. What little information that has been supplied is an outright lie. The story of Malda's moderation system is far more insidious than
merely separating wheat from chaff.

Last night, as I leaned over to give my Natalie Portman poster a tender kiss goodnight, I was psychically cast into a hypnotic trance. While entranced, my spirit guides delivered unto me the tale of the Slashdot moderators. Prepare to have your faith in Mr. Malda and moderation shaken to the core.

Difficult as it is to believe, Rob Malda was an outcast teenager. He did well in some of his classes, but was terrible with English. As is so often the tragic case today, his teachers passed him anyway, just to get rid of him. Since Malda
had no real life, he spent much of his time on the computer (of course), and watching the public-access cable channel. It was there that Malda heard of the mysterious Mongolian Monks.

Malda was watching his favorite talk show, "Elizabeth Claire Prophet." The guests that night were a group of monks based in Mongolia. The monks described how they had been travelling to China to trade some of their cute teen daughters for Natalie Portman memorabilia. The monks had travelled no more than three days when they noticed a brilliant light in the daytime sky. The light grew larger. And larger. And larger. Soon the sky was completely hidden, from horizon to horizon, by a giant metallic disk.

The monks were taken aboard the craft and placed under some sort of alien mind-control. There, they were given the deepest possible insights into the nature of man, the universe and God. A week later, the alien beings returned the monks to the Earth and vanished forever.

The monks considered the area holy ground and constructed a new temple there, not bothering to return to their old monastery. They took their daughters as wives and began their own commune of worship, based on the teachings of the aliens. The monks practiced meditations which unleashed powerful spiritual forces within them. As the wives bore children, the community grew.

Malda was intrigued by the spiritual insights received by the monks and excited by the idea of incestuous pleasures. Unfortunately, the monks had no internet connection and so Malda could not email them. Without hesitation, Malda booked a flight and left for Mongolia. The plane ride was long and tiring, but his curiosity kept him driven.

After a month of searching, Malda finally located the commune. Initially, he, kept a safe distance, for fear of rejection. He studied the monks from afar. Malda had heard stories of the monks' bizarre meditations, which gave them extraordinary powers. Malda was somewhat skeptical of these stories at first, until he saw the truth first-hand.

In the week that Malda studied the monks, he witnessed the breaking of every natural law. He was astonished as he watched the monks levitate, create pockets of lush weather within the commune and communicated with spirit forces. Malda grew more and more excited and he devised a plan for meeting them.

Malda knew the monks would respect him if he could display his own "magical" powers. He was determined to win their confidence, and he had with him all of the necessary tools. He approached the commune confidently. The monks greeted him with skepticism at the gate. Malda took a deep breath and began his show.

Using an AIBO, a can of Jolt Cola and an inflatable sex doll, Malda shocked the monks with his display of magical powers. The monks accepted him into the commune. Malda's head was shaved and he was given a robe and a room. The monks warned Malda to stay away from their daughters-wives.

The monks methodically taught Malda the word of the great messengers. He learned eagerly at first, but soon grew bored with his life in the commune. Malda's life was further stressed when his blow-up doll suffered a puncture-wound and became useless. A few days later, his AIBO's power dried up. With no pet and no woman, Malda slowly grew crazed.

Malda had hit rock-bottom. His penis chafed from dry-hand masturbation and the cold, dry climate. One dark night, he snuck into the kitchen and convinced one of the daughter-wives to join him in his room. Malda was quite relieved that he would finally get some female tenderness... for the first time in his life. He was so excited, he almost closed the deal prematurely.

Unluckily for Malda, the daughter-wife's father-husband was expecting her in bed at that particular moment. The women were expected to be with the monks at a very specific time for retirement. The monk went on a violen rampage throughout the temple, ending with Malda's room. He flung open the door to behold his daughter-wife half disrobed and laying on top of Malda. Malda looked up at the monk and gasped. The daughter-wife giggled.

The monk unsheathed his sword and the aughter-wife was beheaded on the spot. Malda kicked the unviable head away from him and jumped out of the bed. He backed himself into a corner, terrified. The monk approached him the with sword raised. Just as he reached striking distance he dropped the sword and collapsed, crying for the loss of his daughter and the betrayal of his adopted son. Malda was dishonorably discharged from the commune.

Malda wandered into the forest and took shelter in a cave. He spent the next five days curled up in a fetal position, feeding on bat guano and insects. The bitterness and hatred consumed Malda. once again, he was an outsider. He decided that this time, he would not be trampled on.

Malda wandered for three days until he came upon a small village. He entered the shop of the local blacksmith and killed the iron-worker by bashing him in the head with the AIBO. Malda crafted himself a massive machete. He took apart the AIBO and used its quality Sony components to enhance the machete with a nuclear driven flaming mechanism.

Malda returned to the commune. He took one last look at the peaceful community, then hit the ignition switch on his machete. The weapon screamed like a thousand tortured souls as it ignited with flame. Malda then inserted the
rechargeable battery from the AIBO into his rectum. Malda stormed the compound, beheading all of the monks and devouring their brains, thus capturing their souls into the battery in his anus.

The sky turned the color of blood and a great storm of pestilence swept over the village. Malda barely escaped before the commune was decimated by the hand of God, thus purging the terrible evil that had been committed. His face stained with blood and his heart stained with the forces of evil, Malda returned to the United States.

Malda was crazed with power. He devised another insidious plan. He would build an army of mindless followers, which he would use to bring the world to its knees. He would use an online site for the tech-savvy elite to build this army. But he needed a way to control the chaotic masses that would come flocking to his new site. He needed his

Malda prowled the streets of his hometown, enticing male prostitutes with promises of cheap crack cocaine and sexual favors. Once the prostitutes agreed to join Malda in his basement, he would tie them up and place the AIBO battery, upside down, in their rectum. He would then abuse the hapless victim with words of derision and samples of his writing.

The abuse was so severe, that the spirit of the victim would be broken and the soul of one monk would be absorbed from the battery. The resultant creature was not a man, nor a zombie. It was some pathetic monstrosity. The beaten souls of the monks were enslaved to Malda's terrible evil. They depended upon his evil powers for sustenance. Malda labelled his terrible, elite guard the "moderators."

Malda's site grew quickly in popularity and the moderators enforced blandness and conformance with a heavy hand. No good army has room for an individual. The moderators are psychically connected to Malda and know his word. That word is enforced on Slashdot. The subtle moderations effectively warped the minds of those who visited the site and grew addicted, due to the powerful evil force exuded by its words.

Today, Malda sits in his office, strumming his electric guitar, waiting for his army of darkness to ripen.

Re:First Reply to Second Post! (-1, Offtopic)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425992)

Sorry... That was the second reply to the second post... So close, yet so far...

hmmm.. (2, Insightful)

skymester (323871) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425829)

Could states outlaw this?
Or is this so complicated that only states and not criminal indivduals can use it?


Re:hmmm.. (1)

benthesinister (574191) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425948)

You can't outlaw physics. Additionally, the government has made attempts in the past to prevent private citizens from acquiring powerful crypto, but have been unable to do so. Privacy is a right.

Re:hmmm.. (1)

bigberk (547360) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426044)

Or is this so complicated that only states and not criminal indivduals can use it?

Plain Old Computers (POCs) were like that for a long time too. No worries, though, we can always work on the cryptographic development up here in Canada. Maybe this quantum stuff can even be incorporated into OpenBSD [openbsd.org]

What will they do? (4, Interesting)

leshert (40509) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425830)

They'll simply declare that, like plutonium and surface-to-air-missiles, it's something that they can't abide the public owning, and will outlaw it. What else could they do?

Re:What will they do? (1)

dj28 (212815) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425930)

Wrong. Quantum cryptography is not a destructive weapon. It will be treated no differently than it is now. Anyone with enough money to impliment it will be able to do so without any restrictions. The goverernment (in the USA) won't restrict it. The population is becoming more tech savvy and major magazines/institutions have picked up on it. You could say that the genie is out of the bottle now. If they ever wanted to restrict it, it's a little too late now.

On a side note, I have no clue how posts like the parent get modded up. Comparing cryptography to plutonium just doesn't make sense to me. But then again, maybe I'm an idiot.

Re:What will they do? (3, Interesting)

56ker (566853) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425974)

Why then were high-level cryptographic programs prohibited from export from the U.S and still are to certain countries they don't like? It was banned from export because it was classed as a weapon. The USA don't want to go to war with someone they can't eavesdrop on the communications of - that's what this is to prevent. Although it's not a weapon in the conventional sense - it's a defence. Look how effective the Enigma machine was for the Germans until it was broken. If the operators hadn't used easily guessible strings like HIT LER and BER LIN to encode the messages it would've taken far longer to crack it (they were told to randomise them).

Re:What will they do? (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3426016)

Comparing cryptography to plutonium just doesn't make sense to me. But then again, maybe I'm an idiot

Hmm. You're an idiot. But you're wise enough to recognize you're an idiot. But if you're that wise, then you're not an idiot. But if that implies that you're not an idiot, your claim to be an idiot is invalid, meaning that you aren't really wise, and therefore are an idiot.

Nice try Captain Kirk; but it won't wor..fizzle..spark...snap...

Re:What will they do? (1)

Skavookie (3659) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426079)

The US government has classified crypto technology as munitions in the past, so I see no reason they wouldn't do the same here.

The end of cryptographic research looms (0, Redundant)

Cr3d3nd0 (517274) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425833)

Now that we have quantum cyptography it looks like we finally have reached the "uncrackable" code.

Re:The end of cryptographic research looms (1)

ceejayoz (567949) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425845)

Uncrackable as far as we know, at least. There's always a chance of new technology.

Re:The end of cryptographic research looms (2)

evilpenguin (18720) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425908)

We have always had "uncrackable" codes. Any key-based cipher that uses truly random keys that are used exactly once is unbreakable. This is a so-called "one-time pad." So long as they keys are kept secret and the keys are truly random, and each key is used exactly once, there is no way to break the cipher. The nuclear "go" codes are one-time pads. It is a perfect crypto system. The cipher doesn't even have to be particularly strong. Why? Because the key is random and used only once, and given ciphertext can be tried a given key resulting in a given clear text. Since the key was truly random, there is no way to know which "clear text" is correct.

For example, assume the cipher text is "TTYM". You try one candidate key and the clear text is "KILL". You try another and the clear text is "LIVE". There is no way to know which is correct, or if either one is correct.

If the key is used twice, suddenly you are not perfectly secure. If a given candidate key results in the first message clear text of "LIVE" and a second message using the same key decrypts as "GRBL", you probably have the wrong key. If, however, you get "KILL" and "SHIP", you have a more probable correct key. The more messages sent with the key, the more likely the recovery by an attacker (that is to say, the more confidence the attacker will have that a candidate key is correct). The only issue is key management. In fact, key management is the big issue with any crypto system.

Quantum cryptography merely offers an easier to use and manage "perfect" crypto system than a one-time pad. It isn't one whit more secure.

Re:The end of cryptographic research looms (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425946)

User #18720 Info | http://alienmystery.planetmercury.net) We have always had "uncrackable" codes. Any key-based cipher that uses truly random keys that are used exactly once is unbreakable. This is a so-called "one-time pad." So long as they keys are kept secret and the keys are truly random, and each key is used exactly once, there is no way to break the cipher. The nuclear "go" codes are one-time pads. It is a perfect crypto system. The cipher doesn't even have to be particularly strong. Why? Because the key is random and used only once, and given ciphertext can be tried a given key resulting in a given clear text. Since the key was truly random, there is no way to know which "clear text" is correct.

You are on the right track but I thought a clarification might be in order. The idea is that any attempt to invert the encryption will yield multiple plausible soluations, leaving the eavesdropper uncertain (assuming that they have only the cipher text and not the key). However, for this trick to work, the key needs to have a sufficient amount of information (e.g. be random enogh) relative to the encoded message so that the bad guy cannot exploit things like redundancy or other patterns in the plaintext

Re:The end of cryptographic research looms (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3426085)

Quantum cryptography merely offers an easier to use and manage "perfect" crypto system than a one-time pad. It isn't one whit more secure.

Actually Quantum cryptography is not a replacement for a one-time pad. What Quantum cryptography offers is a secure way to send a key that afterwards can be used for a one-time pad.

Only Outlaws Will Have Crypto (-1, Redundant)

ewieling (90662) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425834)

"One can only wonder what the FBI will do."

Outlaw it, of course. For the children ya know.

low number (-1, Offtopic)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425837)

kenyon sucks.

Re:low number (-1, Offtopic)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425964)

i agree. fuck kenyon.

omg (0)

Cenam (567580) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425840)

wht not just intercept the message and process it, then send out the same thing that came in, rather than just relaying it along and ampliphying it like a normal way of intercepting messages, sure there would be a slight lag(whatever the distance in the circuit is devided by the speed of light), but i doubt you can timestamp every photon..

Re:omg (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425866)


If the outsider attempted to peek at a single photon, it would be absorbed by his detector, and he would have to send a replacement photon to the intended recipient. This is where quantum physics trips up the interloper. Photons can be polarized in four directions: vertical, horizontal, and two diagonals. But quantum rules allow you to measure only vertical and horizontal or the two diagonals--not all four. If you measure a photon vertically and horizontally, but it was polarized diagonally, you're out of luck; it is impossible to tell in which of the two diagonals it was polarized.

Re:omg (1)

changelingyahoo.com (543558) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425899)

The problem with this is that you need to know in which direction it was polarized when you first receive the photon. If you guess incorrectly, then you've lost the information in that photon. Since it's possible to incorrectly guess 50% of the time, you could lose up to 50% of the transmission. It's like having to intercept a message by guessing in advance every word in the message. :)

Re:omg (2)

God! Awful (181117) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426074)

The problem with this is that you need to know in which direction it was polarized when you first receive the photon. If you guess incorrectly, then you've lost the information in that photon. Since it's possible to incorrectly guess 50% of the time, you could lose up to 50% of the transmission. It's like having to intercept a message by guessing in advance every word in the message. :)

No, that's not a problem. The reason is that you know the possible spin states ahead of time. You choose one of two possible vectors to measure along, then you tell the sender what your choice was and he can compute the same answer you got.

The real problem with quantum encryption is that it doesn't have any significant advantage over conventional encryption.



Re:omg (1)

changelingyahoo.com (543558) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426082)

oh, no, I was responding to the original message to why intercepting it would not be possible. ;)

I wasn't saying that there was a problem with quantum encryption, I was saying that would be the problem with intercepting the data. :)

Only a matter of time.. (1)

jfisherwa (323744) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425841)

We should all realize by now that words such as "never" and "impossible" do not exist in technology's dictionary.

So, right now we can't eavesdrop without modifying .. means nothing. Research, research, research. We will get there, especially with government dollars backing it.


Re:Only a matter of time.. (2, Informative)

CurMo (172974) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425894)

Not necessarily. The basis of quantum physics is that once a particle has been measured its state is set, and until it is measured it is impossible to know its state (its a roll of the dice). Quantum encryption uses interference to set states and if an outsider does make a measurement of its state (up or down) the state of the particle will get set, and the interference used to make quantum encryption work, will not work correctly. It will not only yield a result that is incorrect to them unless they are at the end of the line with the key, but it will also let someone at the end know that someone is eavesdropping.

Re:Only a matter of time.. (2, Insightful)

skymester (323871) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425918)

But the rules of physics changed often during the centuries. Couldnt it happen again. Someone could come up with something much more sophisticated then quantum mechanics, a new model wich would allow to crack quantum mechanics. The end of physics isnt here yet.


Re:Only a matter of time.. (1, Insightful)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425907)

And I'm sure you'll be there every step of the way explaining that the next step is only a matter of time...

Here's a pence, buy a clue

Impossible? (3, Informative)

squared99 (466315) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425847)

This stuff is getting pretty heavy, but it seems the technology to break this type of cryptography is already in early stages of research. Check out this New Scientist [newscientist.com] article.

Unreadable? or Unretrievable? (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425852)

As the article says, it cannot be read without changing it (eavesdropped upon, rather). Then how can you send it anywhere? I think that a minor disturbance would cause just enough change to make it unreadable. If you can't send it anywhere, then how can it be useful?

Re:Unreadable? or Unretrievable? (1)

Devil's BSD (562630) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425945)

Most likely needs direct line of sight, since air or a vacuum is not likely to alter quantum states. But you do bring up a good point, how will the checksum work? I don't know of a way to 'add' quantum states (yet).

Re:Checksum (1)

CryoPenguin (242131) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426062)

Simple: checksum your data the normal way before encryption.
As for interference: any particular qubit is carried by one photon. If that photon reaches the target at all, then it almost certainly has not been changed by random interference, and if it has, then at most it mangles one bit of the message, which is no worse than line noise in a modem. If a photon doesn't reach the target, then it the receiver notices a gap, and informs the sender.

But they weren't first (2)

alewando (854) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425853)

It's an interesting article that outlines many of the considerations and hurdles one encounters in this field, but there's no breakthrough here. We haven't had a breakthrough since December, 2000 when researchers at UCSB built their latest prototype [scienceagogo.com] capable of consistently detecting such photons. We're bound to make some more breakthroughs soon, it's premature to say we already have recently.

If you're still not clear on the whole quantum cryptography deal, idquantique.com has a good introduction [idquantique.com] (pdf, of course).

They won't do anything for a long time (2)

ColGraff (454761) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425855)

Guys, this isn't something that will be showing up in our homes - or even large corporate offices - for years. Decades, maybe. Once this moves out of Los Alamos and into what I will call, for want of a better term, the "real world", there may be export restrictions on this, just as with PGP. That's all, I'll bet. And for now, I doubt there will be *any* legistlation.

Re:They won't do anything for a long time (1)

skymester (323871) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425890)

Read the article, it says something different:

Over short distances on the ground, quantum cryptography will be much simpler and cheaper. Wireless optical communication systems that span up to five miles are already in use as voice and data networks linking businesses, hospitals, and university campuses. It would be easy to add single-photon encryption to these systems, Hughes says.

Where not there yet, but maybe in 10 years you can get optical ethernet cards with quantum cryptograhy onboard everywhere cheap.

Who knows

Re:They won't do anything for a long time (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3426056)

Slashdot response 1)
"This is hardly any different than xxx, which isn't new"

Slashdot response 2)
"This is still very far out and impractical."

Anybody see a problem here?

Thought for the day (1)

Daftspaniel (527440) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425859)

Look how far we go to avoid trusting one another...
It's a fallen world...

Re:Thought for the day (1)

Antipop (180137) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426026)


look how far we go to trust each other.

it's like the saying about the person who believes everything they read.

Re:Thought for the day (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3426034)

It has nothing to do with trust (not that I should trust you or anyone else I don't know, anymore than you should me) it has to do with me not wanting people like you to know things about me I don't want to tell you.

It's also hardly a bad world where we can't "trust" each other. We should all be working in our own best interests.

Perfect encryption already exists... (3, Insightful)

asparagus (29121) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425868)

...and has so for the past 2000 years.

It's called a one-time pad.

So, before everybody and their brother starts talking about how the NSA can already break this, remember that you can, quite easily, build a 'uncrackable' cypher.

And it'll never be breakable, provided you take some sort of security measures. But if you're paranoid, you already do most of those.

Sorry, this is just a preemptive strike against 'the government can monitor my thoughts" crowd.

Back to your normal high S/N ratio.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425936)

How does one create an uncrackable cypher with the guarantee that it will never be broken?

- Chris

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (5, Informative)

mindstrm (20013) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425966)

With a one-time pad. Like he just said.

Say you have 1kb you need to encrypt.

You generate a 1kb key, and do a simple XOR.

Then you take the key, and the resulting 'encrypted' file, and send them on their merry way. Only when the two are placed together can the original data be recovered.

So as long as nobody obtains the original key, the data is uncrackable. You can't brute force it, because the keyspace is the size of the data itself. Brute forcing it would simply mean generating every single combination of 1k data fields and guessing which one was the original.

Make sense?

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (3, Informative)

automandc (196618) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425937)

The article linked to discusses the fact that quantum cryptography is only an extension of one-time-pad schemes in use since the early 20th century. It also outlines the problems with those systems (i.e. reuse of the meta-key used to transmit the pad-of-the-day, as in the Germans always using "Heil Hitler" as their meta-key, giving the Brits a big fat backdoor to their nominally one-time-only Enigma codes).

It seems to me that, if this article is correct, the advancement of this form of cryptography is probably no more "unbreakable" than the Titanic was unsinkable. The point is only to make it so that an eavesdropper gives away their presence by intercepting (and thereby destroying) some of the key.

IIRC, most quantum schemes contemplate "quantum" transmission (i.e. single photon encoded information) on for the key, while the actual encrypted message is still transmitted through normal means (which would allow for error correction, faster transmission, communications robustness etc.) So, the actual message is still interceptable, and therefore still susceptible to a brute-force attack.

Sure, you might not be able to get realtime intelligence the way the Allies did in WWII, or we did in the Cold War (thanks to tapping into unencrypted underwater cables), but you can still decypher messages given enough time and computing power.

Thus, I repeat, the scheme contemplated here, if I understand it correctly, is no more "unbreakable" than the Titanic was "unsinkable."


no sig is good sig.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (1)

Superkind (261908) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426072)

So, the actual message is still interceptable, and therefore still susceptible to a brute-force attack.
No. If you encrypt (XOR is enough) the message with an equal-sized random key, you simply can not decrypt it without the key. Brute-force is not an option in this case.

Of course now you also have to transmit the key. So you encrypt this key with a meta-key, a key for the key. And that is what the article is about: Secure transmission of this meta-key, the rest can be e-mailed, e.g.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (2, Informative)

Eimi Metamorphoumai (18738) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426105)

You can still make the key the same length as the message, and use it as a one-time pad. So first you send the key (which is just random data), and if it's compromised on the way, you know it (that's the only real benefit of quantum "cryptography", that it cannot be intercepted without being noticable) and don't use it. If the key gets transmitted without interception, then you encode your message with it and send it using any means you want. There's no brute force against a one-time pad. The transmission is secure. The only problems are 1) practicality (cost, range, etc) and 2) out of scope attacks (so they can't get the message while it's in the air. Instead they wait till you decrypt it and then make you reveal it at gunpoint, or more likely just wait for you to email it to someone else, or store it on your computer with the password of "secret").

Quantum Cryptography _IS_ OTP (2)

jacobb (93907) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425950)

QC is an extension of One Time Pads - it makes OTP practical and fast. Search google for Quantum Cryptography, and you'll see.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (1)

Liora (565268) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425952)

Yes, the article even talks about one-time pads, although they only report their existance since the beginning of the last century.

What is really exciting about this is that the key is sent without detection (supposedly... I personally think there will eventually be devices made to counter this by "quantum listening" to that transfer).

Funny enough, that "crowd" you're referring to will still be paranoid even if they don't bother communicating with anyone at all that the government will still monitor their thoughts.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425962)

That's LOW S/N ratio, unless of course you're considering your own post noise.

Sorry, one-time pad is not perfect (2, Interesting)

wadetemp (217315) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425978)

And it'll never be breakable, provided you take some sort of security measures. But if you're paranoid, you already do most of those.

You say it will *never* be breakable if you take some sort of security measures. Never's a pretty tough thing to prove. OK, which measures should you take? How do you know that 1000 years from now, someone will not have perfected time travel and invisibility... how do you know that someone is not standing over your shoulder while you are locked in a lead-lined vault deep inside Mt. Everest as you key in the pad? If you kill yourself after making the pad, how do you know the inflitrator does not have the technology to reconstruct your memories from your brain tissue? The one time pad being perfect "forever" is a bunch of crap. "For now" I can deal with, but not "forever"... which makes it just like most cryptography.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (3, Informative)

keesh (202812) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425991)

Not exactly. One time pads don't:
  • Disguise the length of a message
  • Hide the fact that a message has been sent
Both are very important.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (2)

acidblood (247709) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425998)

Yes, a one-time pad is unbreakable in an information-theoretic sense. However, there are few ciphers today capable of being broken by brute force. Most attacks are directed at protocols and other security problems.

For all practical purposes, 128-bit symmetric key ciphers are as unbreakable as an OTP, even to the three-letter organizations, but without the pratical problems associated to the OTP.

Quantum cryptography comes to extend ``nearly-unbreakable'' crypto even further. From the looks of it, the usage of OTPs will decrease due to quantum crypto, even if it isn't unbreakable.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3426003)

2000 years? That's quite a large age estimate for Vernam. Try something like 150 years.

Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (1)

Mike McTernan (260224) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426058)

Isn't the key distribution a bit of a bummer for one-time pads?

i.e. the key is as big as the message and has to be sent to the recieving party (AKA Bob) in some secure fashion...


Re:Perfect encryption already exists... (1)

ComputerSlicer23 (516509) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426092)

Nope, One Time Pads are the ideal encryption, but not "perfect". The real difference between OTP and key based encryption is that I figuring out one message doesn't lead to a weakness in all the messages. With RSA/DES/AES I crack the key, I get them all, with a OTP I crack one I get one.

For an uncrackable method, use a caeser shift with a one time pad. All messages are equally likely. Assuming you have a truly random number generator it can't be broken. All plaintext could possibly turn into any given ciphertext using the proper key. If they find a copy of the pad you're screwed. To be more useful, use the same shift for 2 chars in a row (see later, yes it has issues, but it solves a major problem with OTP).

One Time Pads also have so many problems in terms of implementation, that is sorta like saying well why bother with those slow clunky Turing machines, quantum based computers are so much better. Yeah right up until you try and use them.

One time pads are handy with a person who you know you're sending off into the wild and know the total amount of communication necessary, but they are kinda limited once you run out of them and have to send another pad. I suppose if you're running out of pad and you can transmit more data then you consume in pad you can overcome this problem (however you probably give up some information to an attack because of this not enough to be truly useful, but some).

You have to be able to securely communicate with that person before hand. I suppose RSA Keys could be used to send the OTP. However now you're encryption is only as good as can RSA is. You must be able to communicate in an absolutely secure way to give them the original pad. For a person who wants to communicate securely with you, and has absolutely no way of communicate securely just once with you can't ever use a OTP. So other methods like Public Key Crypto are good for solving that case.

OTP, isn't very useful for encrypted storage either. If you keep a copy of the OTP around that isn't very secure either now is it?

So don't hold OTP's up as the one true encryption technology. Good encryption guys are smart, if they thought it was feasible they would use it if it was perfect. OTP's could also be broken (aquiring a copy of the Pad), and go undetected, at least with the Quantum stuff in theory, you'd know if it was broken or not.


QC is perfect, current implementations aren't (2, Interesting)

robolemon (575275) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426097)

The reason a one-time pad cipher isn't necessarily "perfect" is that it must be transmitted from the sender to the receiver, which brings up a Catch-22. How do I send this key while ensuring it doesn't get intercepted? Encrypt it! Hmm, a one-time pad cipher is the most secure way. Oh wait, now how do I send that key?

Quantum cryptography addresses this problem by creating a secure communication channel that is detected at the single-photon level. Because detection of a single photon changes it, any eavesdropper can easily be detected when unexpected results are found.

The property of the system that simultaneously makes it both secure and unfit for sending anything other than a one-time pad is that a random portion of the bits sent by the source are rendered useless. When the receiver picks an incorrect detection scheme, the results are ambiguous. The two parties compare notes on what methods they used, and then eliminate all the ambiguous bits. They can't know beforehand which ones will be thrown away. The way to check for eavesdroppers is to use an insecure channel to compare (and then throw away) a portion of the results to see if there are any discrepancies.

After the key is sent, the encoded message can be sent on an insecure channel, since both parties can be sure they have the same key. A one-time pad cipher can never be cracked because, for instance, a 1 kbit message can have any 1 kbit key as its cipher. Therefore the number of keys to check would be 2^(1024). Even after this is completed (well after the end of the world?) the decoded message is found along with every other possible 1 kbit combination. Any possible 1 kbit file can would be found among the results. This is no better than writing a program that fills memory with files that contain the numbers from 0 to 2^(1024)-1.

Some researchers are actually attacking the implementation of quantum cryptography rather than the theory. The devices used in QC actually send light down the fiber optic lines that damages the equipment on both ends resulting in predictable behavior. However, there are already safeguards developed against these type of attacks. Essentially it comes down to this question: "Is there a perfect implementation of Quantum Cryptography?"

Interception vs. Encryption (2, Interesting)

Guybrush1 (126293) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425871)

What this means is that the message can only be read once, not that the message is impossible to decrypt. The government still has the same job it's always had.

Plus the distances involved are microscopic. For this to matter much to the government the single quanta of data has to last long enough to travel a significant distance.

Re:Interception vs. Encryption (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425942)

What this means is that the message can only be read once, not that the message is impossible to decrypt.

No. Read the article:

"The Los Alamos team is one of at least a dozen groups worldwide that are harnessing quantum physics to develop perfect encryption: coded messages impervious to the efforts of hackers".

Plus the distances involved are microscopic. For this to matter much to the government the single quanta of data has to last long enough to travel a significant distance.

6 Miles is not micropscopic. Oh yeah, you didn't read the article...

Re:Interception vs. Encryption (5, Interesting)

cheese_wallet (88279) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425961)

I'm guessing you didn't read the article. They've been able to do this over a distance of 6 miles in open air. Not bad, considering this is an infancy stage.

Yeah, it means the message can only be read once. But in this case the message is the key for a one time pad encryption.

Basically this makes one time pad encryption a whole lot more secure than it was before. One time pads, I think, are the best form of encryption--but the problem has been the security of the key.

this whole photon quantum encryption deal addresses that issue in a really neat way.

Cool, but the FBI don't have to do anything. (3, Insightful)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425875)

Sorry to bring bad news, but quantum cryptography is unlikely to become available to the likes of us. The reason:

Alice and Bob have a length of optical fibre running between them, and are using quantum cryptography. Eve attempts to evesdrop, but is unable to do so without changing the information in the signal (polarisation etc). Eve is foiled. Hurrah!

Now imagine that Alice and Bob are mere mortals and get to use the phone network like the rest of us.

The system they use is a standard fibre & router system, but the actual fibre is encrypted. What is Eve to do?

Answer: She installs a tap on the repeater, because quantum crypto only works over single lengths of fibre.

As if by magic quantum cryptography only becomes useful to people who get to dig holes in the road, such as phone companies, big business and the government. We little people don't even get to play the game.

Flaw in this Encryption Scheme (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425979)

This article describes a method for negotiating a key between two end points, Alice and Bob. The key will then be used to encrypt the data that they send next. The problem with this scheme is that it doesn't really stop Eve from getting in the middle.

If Eve is present as Alice and Bob start their key negotiation, then Eve can detect the photons that Alice sends, and completely block them from going to Bob. Eve then sends her answers back to Alice, pretending to be Bob. In the other direction, Eve pretends to be Alice, and generates her own string of photons to send to Bob. The net effect? Eve has just generated two point to point encrypted links, and can eavesdrop on all of Alice and Bob's data. She just has to decrypt and reencrypt all data. Furthermore, Alice and Bob are both completely oblivious to the fact that Eve is snooping on them.

The article described using this for free space encryption, for laser links between earth and satelites, for example. It seems pretty difficult to interlope between Earth and a satelite, but if it was possible, the same problem occurs.

This scheme would work if Eve was not around during key negotiation. However, imagine that Eve is an ISP, or the FBI (think Carnivore), permanently sitting in between Alice and Bob. In this situation the encryption is useless.

MOD THIS DOWN... (2, Informative)

univgeek (442857) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426080)

The experiment was performed in FREE-SPACE...


Which means you dont need to dig holes and most of the assumptions of the poster are invalidated.

Read the article first people.

Re: Quantum Cryptography In Action (1)

rmohr02 (208447) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425882)

[I]t is impossible for an eavesdropper to intercept the message without changing it. One can only wonder what the FBI will do.
They'll probably intercept a whole message (completely stop it) and send another message just like it on the same line a split second later. Of course, as I'm not an expert on quantum physics there might be some flaw in my plan.

Re: Quantum Cryptography In Action (1)

skymester (323871) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425896)

No, as far as i understand you can only read the message if you have the key. And you have only one chance to try.

Re: Quantum Cryptography In Action (1)

changelingyahoo.com (543558) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425919)

The problem would be in intercepting it in the first place. An interceptor has only one shot at properly decoding each photon. Since an interceptor would get possibly 50% of them decoded incorrectly, they wouldn't be able to decode the message nor repeat the original message.

Re: Quantum Cryptography In Action (2)

wadetemp (217315) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425923)

I haven't read the article yet (FWIW,) but I am pretty sure that it is impossible to replay the message, because to be able to replay it something has to "look" at it, and if it's "looked" at, you've affected it, so what you're "seeing" is not what you need to replay. It's the basic Hiesenberg principles at work. Ok, going to read the article now to see if it provides any deep insight into how *anyone* is supposed to read these. :)

Back to the pre computer days of cryptography (1)

littlerubberfeet (453565) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425909)

Quantam computers are the only ones which have the processing power to break what is in essance, the one time pad used by light (quantam cryptography). When computers came along at the end of WWII, we could start stabbing at one time pads and Zeta functions, which are almost as difficult to crack. Now, we are back at that pre WWII stage where Pads are near impossible. Now, quantam cryptography on its own is vulnerable to brute force cracking, as all encyption is. What makes it secure is the fact that you can't intercept it. And already some universities have been plying with induction-based pickups for fiber optics.

Good scoop. (1)

Moosifer (168884) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425910)

Liquid helium and quantum boosters that are only about a decade away... Why not post a story about personal rocketships whisking us away to the surface of Mars?

The true effects of quantum computers (0, Troll)

Klerck (213193) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425915)

First, I'd like to point out that quantum computation and quantum encryption are two almost completely separate concepts. Quantum encryption is based on the fact that quantum states cannot be measured without altering. The most common example is the polarization of a photon, but it will work for any quantum state, so long as there exist, effectively, two unique states that can transmit the data.

Quantum computation, however, is much more complex and much more interesting. Quantum computers are based on the concept of quantum entanglement, the ability of a quantum state to exist in a superposition of all of its mutually exclusive states: It's a 1 and a 0. However, this is not as easy to use as one might think. While it's true that if you have n quantum logic gates you have the ability to input 2^n data values simultaneously (as opposed to only 1 piece of data if you have n digital logic gates), this is not going to be the end of classical computing for a few reasons. First, quantum computers have to be perfectly reversible. That means for every output there's an input and vice versa. And there has to be no way of knowing the initial states of the data. You don't process data, you process probabilities in a quantum computer; if you know exactly what any one value is throughout the computation, you can find out all of the values: the superposition ends and you're stuck with a useless chunk of machinery. This means YOU CAN ONLY GET ONE RESULT FROM ANY QUANTUM COMPUTATION, THE END RESULT. You can't see what the data in the middle is or the computer becomes useless. (Landauer's principle makes heat loss data loss. When your processor gets hot, it's losing data. If the same thing happened to a quantum computer, it wouldn't be quantum anymore.) Decoherence is what happens when you randomly lose data to the environment by design, not by choice, and the superposition ends. This is bad for Q.C. Oh, and quantum computers can only do *some* things faster, like prime factorization and discrete logarithms. Not multiplication or addition. Plus, the circuits that would do basic arithmetic would be bigger and slower than what you've currently got.

So what does this all mean? It means that quantum computers are going to provide some advantages (real quick big number factorization), and some disadvantages (that whole RSA standard). The most realistic initial use of quantum computers will be as add-ons to existing super-computers to resolve certain types of NP-Complete headaches that regular math can't simplify yet. At best they will someday be an add-on to your PC; but they will never replace the digital computer.~

If you want more info, check out http://www.qubit.org [qubit.org], it's got some decent tutorials.

Osama? (2, Insightful)

Devil's BSD (562630) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425921)

We all know deep down that the big concern is he-who-is-not-to-be-named, namely Osama bin Laden. The thing is though, that it's not likely that he will get his hands on this laser-o-doom. Even if he did, he couldn't likely use it, as it probably requires a direct line of sight. Fiber uses the principle of total internal reflection to transmit light, but this reflection causes some of the light to polarize, changing the quantum state and making the data invalid. So as of now, I think this is only for ./'ers edification.

FBI != Bad? (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425949)

Yes i know about Cointelpro, yes i know about Hoover, yes i know about the "Patriot act" but why does the FBI always get attacked first? What about the NSA? (B/C they are willing to spy on non US targets w/ echelon?) Most of the world would fear echelon (NSA Spy network) before the FBI.

Wide like you momma's azz (-1, Troll)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425959)

And I bet she's a communist linux using hippie too. You both need to get jobs!

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Initial handshake? (1)

changelingyahoo.com (543558) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425968)

I'd be interested in seeing how the initial key exchange works. The receiver randomly chooses orientations and derives a bit pattern from the incoming transmission. Makes sense. It then says the receiver reports which random choices it made to the sender. I'm not sure exactly how the sender is able to decode this transmission from the receiver. It cant choose random orientations else it would lose the data which indicates the shared key. Any ideas?

Re:Initial handshake? (2, Insightful)

changelingyahoo.com (543558) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426011)

I'm going to respond to my own question with a possible solution.

After reading one of the more detailed articles linked to the original, I think one solution is to agree as a matter of protocol that the receiver's report will consist of photons all polarized in a specific direction.

The sender sends some random data to the receiver using photon polarization. The receiver randomly chooses polarizations and reports back to the sender its list of choices without polarizing (or using a consistent polarization). The sender then tells it which choices were correct (once again without polarization). At this point all subsequent data could be sent polarized using the bit pattern from the correctly chosen photons to determine the polarization pattern.

Re:Initial handshake? (1)

CryoPenguin (242131) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426040)

For a quantum encryption session to happen, you need two channels: the optic fiber/line of sight to send the qubits on, and also a conventional channel which can be snooped but not altered. You use the conventional channel to say which orientation you measured each bit in.

FBI? Thats not the big worry! (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 11 years ago | (#3425980)

Just wait till Direct Tv get ahold of this technology. Then we will have major problems!

I'm not up on this sort of thing... (2)

lavaforge (245529) | more than 11 years ago | (#3425983)

So how does the intended recipient get the message without changing it?

Similar example (1)

moop (140175) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426018)

I couldn't find the link, but there was another example of this that a professor at Harvard introduced about a year ago. The scheme was to have a satellite that did nothing but stream numbers to everyone all the time. So when someone would use a purely random number, at a random time, from the satellite to encrypt the message, at the same time the other user would also start recording the incoming numbers, and stop recording at the exact same time as the sender. Now they both have the key, and it was never sent, and due to the billions of numbers that are being sent from the satellite there is no feasble way to know what the key is, or to store all the numbers being sent.

Routing (2, Interesting)

zaffir (546764) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426023)

The problem with quantum encryption, as i see it, is that nobody can read it without changing it. Routing data without reading it will be a real challenge. Or i'm a complete moron who hasn't read about this stuff enough.

Re:Routing (1)

changelingyahoo.com (543558) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426045)

Quantum encryption would be an L1 encryption technology, so it would only applicable to direct point-to-point connections; it wont influence routing. It's the same as being able to route traffic originating from 802.11 and CSMA/CD devices. The specifics of the L1 protocol aren't really important so long as it's supported in the L2 protocol.

Re:Routing (1)

CryoPenguin (242131) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426048)

One way to route a quantum channel is to physically splice optic fibers together, creating a point-to-point connection for the duration of the message. This doesn't seem very feasible, but it is possible.

quantum booster? (2)

toast0 (63707) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426032)

if a man in the middle can't read and resend the communications w/out fubaring it (ignore the possiblity of a man in the middle attack where the middle encrypts and decyrpts with both sides) how the heck does a quantum booster work w/out fubaring the signal?

liquid helium? (1)

kidlinux (2550) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426064)

"Users don't want to be pouring liquid helium into their secure network system. They want something they can plug into the wall," Hughes says.

Depends on who you talk to ;)
A silent (and extreme) cooling system and quantum cyrptography all in one! The overclockers dream.
Now you can crack keys [distributed.net] or search for aliens [seti.org] and send in your results securely. And with liquid helium you can double (or more?) the speed you do it at!

How This Really Works (3, Interesting)

Muerte23 (178626) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426086)

The holy grail of encryption these days is the instantaneous Vernam Cypher. Say you have two computers seperated by many km, with two fibers running between them (for each direction).

First you take your bits and XOR them with your randomly generated One Time Pad. Then you send the encrypted text over one channel.

NowNext to your computer you have a little box that generates entangled photons from some sort of parametric downconversion (one photons goes into a crystal and comes out two photons). These photons are (made to be) polarization entangled, meaning you don't know that their polarization is, but whatever it is, both photons share it.

Now you take one of those photons and send it through a polarizer that you have rotated according to the appropriate bit on your One Time Pad. Then you see whether you get a photon or you don't, and send this information to your friend.

Your friend receives the second of the photon pair, and runs a similar polarization measurement.

Now, your friend has three pieces of information: (1) your cyphertext (2) the results of your polarizer pass and (3) the other entangled photon. Thanks to quantum mechanics, your friend can now decode the cyphertext based on the results of his entanged photon passing through the polarizer.

The advantage of this system is that you need all three pieces of information to break the cypher, and the third peice, by the laws of physics, can only be measured once. If an attackers intercepts your communication, he might be able to read part of it, but you will instantly know that ther is someone tapping the line.

The disadvantage is that you can't use any repeaters, as this will destroy the entanglement of your photons. You just have to have really good fibers.

Sorry for the long-windedness, but a less technical explanation really leaves out the juice, and a more technical explanation goes into some extreme handwaving and diagrams.


Nothing new (1)

Vadim Makarov (529622) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426102)

As much as I am glad that quantum crypto research receives exposure in the media, there's nothing new in the article. Free-space cryptography has been demonstrated in few places. The latest one promises a 24km link (not quite yet, Dr. Kurtsiefer?).

One comment: even if you need to cool your detector to cryogenic temperatures, you don't have to have your customer pour liquid nitrogen (or did they say liquid helium?) into the commercial device. This is what compact no-maintenance closed-cycle coolers are for.

Plug #1: idQuantique [idquantique.com]
Plug #2: Magiq Technologies [magiqtech.com]
Plug #3: Los Alamos lab [lanl.gov] (yes there used to be a site there)
Plug #4: Our own research [vad1.com] (not commercially-oriented yet)

We know what this means... (1)

DragonWyatt (62035) | more than 11 years ago | (#3426107)

It's been said before and it bears repeating...

If it can be done, chances are that someone [nsa.gov] has been doing it for a long time.
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