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HD-DVD and Blu-Ray Protections Fully Broken

Zonk posted more than 7 years ago | from the open-season dept.

Movies 682

gEvil (beta) writes "According to an article at BoingBoing, the processing keys for the AACS encryption scheme used by both HD-DVD and Blu-Ray video discs have been extracted, and a crack has been released. What this means is that there is now a method to extract the copy-protected content of any HD-DVD or Blu-Ray disc out there. This is different from Muslix64's previous crack, which only extracted the volume key for each disc. This new method bypasses this step and allows anyone to extract the data without first requiring the volume key."

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682 comments

Nice. (5, Funny)

FatSean (18753) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000156)

In five years, when I finally buy into HD television and content, there should be an assload of free content out there to download.

Re:Nice. (-1, Troll)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000356)

An "assload"? What the fuck is that supposed to mean, shitcock?

Re:Nice. (5, Funny)

Tumbleweed (3706) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000620)

An 'assload' is the metric name for 'buttload', both of which are greater than or equal to 1 'shitload' or 'crapload', respectively. I know the whole Imperial/metric conversion thing is problematic at times, but you could've at least Googled this before asking such a silly question.

Re:Nice. (5, Funny)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000920)

Actually, wouldn't the correct metric term be "arseload"?

Re:Nice. (4, Funny)

eno2001 (527078) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000922)

Well, seeing that the average ass on Slashdot is probably about three to four feet wide, two feet high (from a sitting position) and about a foot deep from front to back, that means at most eight cubic feet of HD DVDs ripped and placed online. In reality, I'm not sure what the parent poster was that happy about since eight cubic feet of DVDs is actually not that much. I would have been inclined to say, "Great! This means that when I buy into HD stuff in five years, there should be more HD content online than there have been cocks in porno actress Houston's Yoni. If you catch my drift..." A little more accurate.

OK, time to switch now! (5, Insightful)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000184)

The time has come to make the upgrade.

drm (5, Funny)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000196)

years to create, weeks to break- sounds about right.

Re:drm (5, Funny)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000756)

The solution is obvious, we need even tighter, more intrusive DRM!

props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere (5, Insightful)

cpearson (809811) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000222)

It puts a smile on my face knowing that a small group of unpaid media hackers are able to crack the AACS encryption scheme what tooks many developers and millions in R&D to create, in just a few short weeks.

Vista Help Forum [vistahelpforum.com]

Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere (5, Insightful)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000924)

cpearson,

It has always been easier to destroy/crack something than to create it in the first place.

It is not a great undertaking to break a DRM scheme. It is not comparable to cracking strong encryption (which takes lots of horse power). The basic concept of DRM is fundamentally flawed and therefore open to attack.

DRM by its nature is both widely available and has to function on a user's local device or PC. The wide availability (unlike an encrypted message with a unique key) means the attacker has easy access both the algorithm and protected content. This mathematically greatly reduces uniqueness. One only has to setup the correct environment and observe how it functions with a legal copy. And since the DRM scheme is most likely non-unique on a copy by copy basis the affect instantly cascades. Unlike getting a randomly encrypted file you have access to the algorithm (the software) and you have access to the keys.

The big issue in DRM is how to obfuscate your algorithm and how to keep people from getting access to the stream in the clear. Both of these tasks are next to impossible to carry out effectively.

So anyone, even the very same "small group of unpaid media hackers" in question, would have to spend a large amount of effort trying to come up with better and better obfuscation schemes. While cracking the DRM will take far less resources, focus, or time.

Cracking DRM is more akin to white box QA or reverse engineering.

All that said I'm secretly glad someone stepped up and did this :-) DRM as it exists today is pointless, useless, and gets in the way of a customers fair use of something they have purchased.

I'm willing to bet 5 years from now we will see far less DRM in use and those still using it won't be selling as much music or as many movies as those not using it.

All DRM implementations will be broken. (5, Insightful)

MartinG (52587) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000226)

DRM is fundamentally broken by design. Ciphers of this kind rely on the attacker not getting hold of the key. At the same time, the recipient needs the key to get the data. I can never work because the attacker is the same person as the recipient.

In effect, DRM is security through obscurity.

How much longer will we have to put up with this crap before the media companies realise this and stop inconveniencing their customers and wasting our money and time as well as their own?

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (5, Insightful)

mrsbrisby (60242) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000320)

It can never work because the attacker is the same person as the recipient.
That's why TPM is being pushed by DRM proponents: TPM means your computer no longer trusts you (its owner). It means that someone that can convince Verisign to sign their key will be able to have access to all your secrets- including the ones that you do not. It already happened. [microsoft.com]

Forget all that jibber-jabber about whether they have a right to protect their "copyrights", or even if you have any rights to copy: they clearly cannot be trusted with your secrecy and your privacy.

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (4, Insightful)

Tumbleweed (3706) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000572)

And the problem with TPM is that you still have access to the hardware. If you've got that and enough time and skill, TPM eventually won't matter, either.

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (5, Funny)

tzhuge (1031302) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000982)

Hmm... the logical conclusion is the MPAA needs site security in people's homes so they can prevent access to the hardware. They're probably working on it right now. Maybe some sort of USB powered taser would work?

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (2, Interesting)

FireFury03 (653718) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000994)

And the problem with TPM is that you still have access to the hardware. If you've got that and enough time and skill, TPM eventually won't matter, either.

Presumably you don't even need access to the hardware - just emulate all the hardware (including the TPM) and you can poke around at the hardware's innards all you want then.

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (4, Funny)

spellraiser (764337) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000344)

Or things could go in the opposite direction. Just wait 'till they hear about one-time pads!

Of course, that would mean that no one could watch their stuff, period, but hey - at least no one could pirate it either!

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (4, Funny)

Tumbleweed (3706) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000702)

You know, if they go for one-time pad encryption for only the most popular movies, then society would probably be better off. Hopefully they could implement that right at the source - Will Farrell and Ben Stiller themselves encrypted with one-time pads. Yeah, that'd about do it for me.

For as long as... (5, Funny)

DimGeo (694000) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000390)

... there are developers clever enough to lie to the media companies that this can be done, and then get paid to do it over and over again. :) I kinda like the idea :) :) :)

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (1)

ArsonSmith (13997) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000460)

Just out of curiosity what would you consider security not through obscurity? Only one I can think of is living breathing security guards. Everything else is just a matter of obscuring the way to get into something.

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (3, Insightful)

tuffy (10202) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000790)

Security not through obscurity would be akin to keeping the decryption key from a third party so that he'll have to try and use brute force to decrypt your data. Much like how web browsers use SSL to keep packet sniffers at bay.

In the case of DRM, the guy who wants to watch the movie is the same person that the studios are trying to keep from decrypting it. So they try and hide the decryption key in the player so the owner can't find it. Thus, DRM always boils down to finding a way of obscuring the key's location in a big game of hide-and-seek.

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (1)

spun (1352) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000802)

It's a specific concept, different that just "obscuring the way to get into something." With security through obscurity, knowing the underlying implementation will grant you access, not just knowing the authentication factor. It's the difference between "The password must remain obscure or people will get into our system" and "The algorithm must remain obscure or prople will get into any system using it, regardless of the obscurity of the password."

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (4, Informative)

CastrTroy (595695) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000862)

Security through obscurity means that you hide the way your security algorithm works in order to make it seem more secure than it is. Take a safe for instance. Security through obscurity would be trying to hide how the safe was designed, and trying to stop the thief from touching the safe in order to prevent them from breaking into it. A safe that doesn't rely on security through obscurity means that you could give the plans to the safe, to show how it's made, and all the mechanisms inside, as well as give him free access to the safe to try to do a bunch of things with it, and you would still be sure that he wouldn't break into the safe, short of using brute force. Common encryption algorithms like RSA are believed to be secure, even though everybody already knows how they work. The only way people know to break them, is to try all the keys. This is like trying every possible combination on a safe, in order to open it. Instead of safes which aren't really secure, that you can break just by listening to the tumblers with a stethescope.

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (3, Insightful)

MartinG (52587) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000944)

Asymmetric ciphers are not security through obscurity as long as the key is not in the hands of the attacker. When used properly, the whole process is totally transparent and the attacker can see the encrypted data all day long and knows exactly how the system works but still can't get at the unencrypted data. It is not obscured at all.

Security through obscurity is where the attacker has everything they need to get at the data but they just have a few hoops to jump through. Proper security is where the attacker has no chance because they are missing something (like a secret key)

DRM gives the attacker the key (because the attacker is the owner of the media and they need the key to play it) but makes some attempt to hide it. All these attacks on DRM do not break the cipher or find a weakness in the crypto algorythm. All they do is find the key (it's in there somewhere) and use it to decrypt the content.

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (-1, Troll)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000614)

No. All DRM that runs on the proprietary piece of shit Microsoft system powered by the obsolete piece of shit Intel Pentium processor will be broken.

Glass

security through obscurity (3, Insightful)

hAckz0r (989977) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000696)

Yes, and just how obscure can a "standard" be? I have been harping on just how stupid the whole concept of DRM is, ever since Sony root-kitted everyone. Even after Gates makes all Windows boxes a "trusted system" we can just dust off the logic analyzers and hack the bios. If that does not work, vm's, and OS emulators will. There is no limit to the ingenuity of a pissed-off geek when they can't play what they just payed good money for, but only because of some arbitrary restriction embedded in the code. Just give a dedicated geek the binary and they will know _all_ the "secrets" about how it works. Thats a given. DRM by design can never logically work no matter how much time, energy, and money the designers throw into it. It is a flawed concept by design.

Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. (1)

grumble_au (1041604) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000934)

Between the truism about DRM being security by obscurity and the rather cool obfuscation of your email address in your sig I find this something of a zenlike post.

Horseshoe racket (4, Insightful)

RichardDeVries (961583) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000250)

Instead of spending billions on technologies that attack paying customers, the studios should be confronting that reality and figuring out how to make a living in a world where copying will get easier and easier. They're like blacksmiths meeting to figure out how to protect the horseshoe racket by sabotaging railroads.
The railroad is coming. The tracks have been laid right through the studio gates. It's time to get out of the horseshoe business.

Exactly.

Re:Horseshoe racket (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000452)

They're like blacksmiths meeting to figure out how to protect the horseshoe racket by sabotaging railroads.
The railroad is coming.


Worst anology ever.

WTF does that anology mean. Are people who break DRM supposed to be the railroad? Are you comparing a group of hackers who deal in electronic data to the railroad which drove the industrial revolution and set the course for western civilization as we know it.

I have head soem bad one in my day but this anology is up there.

How about an alogoy where the hackers are some kind of meat based processed food product and the **AA is a song bird, that would be good. Somebody come up with that anology.

Re:Horseshoe racket (4, Insightful)

melikamp (631205) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000804)

Content publishers are the blacksmiths, DVD's are the horseshoes, BT trackers are the railroads. This is the best analogy ever.

Re:Horseshoe racket (3, Insightful)

Miseph (979059) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000906)

Actually, it's a very good analogy. It is intended to show the futility of DRM and copy protections (stopping the railroad) by the media giants who have shoehorned themselves into forced obsolescence (blacksmiths), and point out that perhaps instead of trying to prevent copying, which they cannot do, they should find ways to profit from it any way (railroad tracks are made out of steel, blacksmiths work with steel, instead of making horseshoes, they could make railroad tracks, or even locomotive parts).

And yes, for the record, I think it IS fair to say that hackers working on ways to disseminate data electronically faster and more efficiently are like the people who first put together the railroads: they are radically changing how we think about moving "goods" and conducting business; they also share some similar personality characteristics, such as creativity (to come up with ways to make things happen), intelligence (or do you think any dumbass can perform either task?), and vision (to imagine a way of doing things radically different than the ways that they are done now). DRM crackers may not be the guys laying the tracks or inventing the steam engine, but they ARE the guys designing comfortable passenger cars, figuring out where stations need to go, and showing people how much cheaper and easier it is to travel by train rather than taking a carriage.

Re:Horseshoe racket (1)

homey of my owney (975234) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000812)

I'm with AC above, how is this moded as insightful? If we follow the analogy, the MPAA should get out of the business because we are now free to copy the content they no long make?

Tagging Beta (-1, Redundant)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000256)

Haha!

I disagree (4, Insightful)

TheSHAD0W (258774) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000266)

After reading through the article I must conclude that while the author has made decoding current discs easier, AACS has NOT been "fully cracked". The key embedded in the current software may be expired in the future, rendering this method useless for discs produced after that expiration.

I'm not saying that this isn't a nice event, but we have further work to do.

Re:I disagree (4, Interesting)

p0tat03 (985078) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000430)

The same method used to acquire this key can be used to acquire future keys. All it takes is one determined hacker willing to rifle through his memory addresses for the key.

I do not see a terribly effective fix for this - your key has to exist somewhere, and even in a CPU register it is still in memory more often than not.

Re:I disagree (1, Interesting)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000486)

Correct. And there are plenty of things that can be done to make this a lot harder. What was broken was a poor implementation of a decoder. I suspect that not only will that key be revoked, but also that player author may lose their right to future keys until they show that they have fixed this problem adequately.

This is not remotely "fully cracked". However, IF the cracker had not revealed what player was involved, and instead just provided a website for obtaining the disc keys, THEN you could call it "fully cracked", since that would provide the ability to decode without the ability to revoke. As long as the crackers feel the need to prove that they really cracked the DRM by providing all the details of how it was cracked, it can never be "fully cracked".

In hindsight, we may see that the downfall of DRM crackers is the same hubris that brought about the downfall of DRM.... *sigh*

Re:I disagree (1)

FunkyELF (609131) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000950)

I'm no expert so could you explain a couple of things....
Could you explain why they wouldn't be able to figure out which player it came from if they didn't release all of their details.
Also, if both of these cracks can be rendered useless in future releases via key revocation, then what is different between this one and Muslix64's crack?

Nope, it's really cracked (5, Insightful)

suv4x4 (956391) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000488)

After reading through the article I must conclude that while the author has made decoding current discs easier, AACS has NOT been "fully cracked". The key embedded in the current software may be expired in the future, rendering this method useless for discs produced after that expiration.

In theory yes, but how easy do you believe it is to update all those specialized video players, all offline?

Don't forget: the people who buy those already had to put up with paying premium for a HDTV, expensive players, and also make sure the TV, cable and player play together through HDMI.

If you start demanding they are hooked non-stop to Internet so they can receive the daily patches, it may just be the thing crossing the line of tolerance.

Also: the hard part is retrieving keys from pure hardware. The new keys come as firmware updates over the network.. it's even easier to update those HD-DVD/BlueRay rippers. After all, you have even the keys they encrypted the patches with: you have the player, don't you.

All in all, the "super morphing update" ability of AACS seems more like a way for the AACS developers to claim "the war it's not over", when it effectively is over.

Companies will refuse to use the new keys for their disks, since they will be incompatible with plenty of the players out there, the AACS creators will whine a bit about how "they could fix it but they don't wanna, not our fault", and this is where it'll end.

Re:Nope, it's really cracked (1)

Xugumad (39311) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000940)

> If you start demanding they are hooked non-stop to Internet so they can receive the daily patches, it may just be the thing crossing the line of tolerance.

Not to mention, while people can understand the idea of requiring an HDMI connector on their TV to go with the HDMI connector on their HD-DVD/Blu-Ray player, and are likely to accept without asking, telling your customers that they need to update their player to play new disks is just asking for them to stop and ask why...

Re:I disagree (1)

chill (34294) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000536)

Yes, but wouldn't his method of recording the memory location changes work again? I believe they could take a page from OpenBSD's playbook (and others) and randomize memory locations, but short of de-authorizing every player that does it the old way, they're screwed.

Even with memory randomization, you could find it, since he knows what to look for.

Absolute DRM is a fundamentally flawed concept. It is like locks on interior (hollow) doors. They aren't there to keep you out, they're there to let you know you should keep out. If you're determined, all they can do is slow you down.

 

Too funny... (4, Insightful)

esarjeant (100503) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000274)

When will the media industry learn that DRM strategies simply don't work?

As soon as you can see or hear it, it is then possible to duplicate it. No amount of copy protection will ever be able to prevent that short of preventing consumers from accessing the material altogether.

Learn to trust your consumers a little and focus on adding value to the material, and then people will buy your content. It might also help to provide some flexibility in the content licensing model, maybe giving people the option to upgrade DVD discs to HD-DVD for the same content may encourage them to continue buying media.

Funny until they mandate "Reality Filters" (1)

spun (1352) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000926)

Just wait. We'll all be required to have "reality filter" chips installed between our optic and auditory nerves, and our brain. Only properly licensed material will be permitted to be perceived. And you'll have to license EVERYTHING, because it potentially competes with MAFIAA controlled content. I'm guessing we have it by 2025. >:-(

Can this be fixed? (5, Interesting)

CastrTroy (595695) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000286)

Can this be fixed by revoking a player key? Or is this a more extensive breach like what happened with DECSS? Will this work on all future discs, or does it just work on the discs that are currently being produced?

Yes, someone walk us through this. (1)

Valdrax (32670) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000366)

Is this a weakness in a particular player, in a particular driver, or in the standard reference method of decrypting a disc that allowed the guy at Doom9 to figure out how to get the player key?

What exactly is this "processing key," and how fundamental / changeable is it?

Re:Can this be fixed? (1)

yanos (633109) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000522)

It seems to be working for all disc produced so far. I don't think revoking the player key will do much good but since it's not a breach à la DECSS (the encryption is not cracked, he just happen to stumble on a key), I'm sure movie studios will find a way to render this particular key obsolete with future releases.

Re:Can this be fixed? (1)

jo42 (227475) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000622)

...and then they will find the new key.

Repeat.

Re:Can this be fixed? (1)

yanos (633109) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000864)

Of course. But it will still remain a bit of an hassle this way. If we want to play those disc the way we currently are playing dvds on our linux box, we'll have to wait until someone actually crack the encryption.

if i ... (1)

cosmocain (1060326) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000292)

...would get a dollar everytime someone claimed that something is/was/will be unbreakable...

and somehow a few weeks later it was "broken"...

uh, man. i'd be THAT rich.*


*a man can dream, can't he?

industry's response? (4, Interesting)

bcrowell (177657) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000298)

So what is the industry's response to all this? Can they deal with the problem without breaking every DVD player in existence? Is the encryption completely symmetric? Can they start releasing DVDs with new keys, without creating a situation where some DVD players can read old dics, and others can read new ones? Are different keys used in Europe, U.S., etc.?

Now we get to see... (3, Interesting)

ameline (771895) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000302)

Now we get to see how effective the key revocation system (that forms part of aacs) is going to be.

Should be interesting...

Re:Now we get to see... (4, Interesting)

awkScooby (741257) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000642)

They won't do it. Their bluff has been called.

Revoking keys would have a huge negative impact on the adoption of HD-DVD and Blue-Ray. Look at the backlash from the Sony rootkit -- that was something a lot of consumers were/are unaware of. It's harder to be unaware of the fact that your $900 dvd player no longer works, or your $2000 HDTV doesn't work. The inevitable lawsuits aren't worth it.

Re:Now we get to see... (4, Interesting)

AnyoneEB (574727) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000856)

They would only be revoking keys used by software players. Eventually someone will probably go through the effort to get keys out of a hardware player, but it is a lot more work to do so.

All your CRAP are belong to us (4, Insightful)

sehlat (180760) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000312)

I've said before, "safemaker, safebreaker."

Hollywood gets ONE move in the game: "Protecting" the content.

The rest of the world gets as many moves as it wants to get around the ConsumerRightsArentPermitted.

So Hollywood does everything it can to make itself hated by its customers and still expects to WIN this game?

oblig Pirate Bay (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000342)

Free, free at last. Free in HD.

Released Too Early (4, Insightful)

MrSteveSD (801820) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000348)

I think they've made a mistake by breaking it too early. They should have waited until it was much more widespread. Then again, I would imagine it is psychologically virtually impossible to sit on a "breakthrough" like that.

Re:Released Too Early (5, Insightful)

zappepcs (820751) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000638)

Wrong! Break the DRM, Break it early, and break it often. DRM is dead, in fact it was stillborn. The foundational thinking behind DRM (or CRAP if you like) was so 'not right' that it's 'not even wrong' and it isn't getting any better. The more often the *AAs have to fight back with new DRM the more likely it is that we will see who in the governments is getting paid to support DRM, and then we will really have a target to ridicule, impeach, or tar and feather.

The premise that all consumers are criminals is criminal in and of itself. Bear with me here. It defies logic and law to (analogy time) remove guns from citizens to prevent them from shooting people. It defies logic and good business sense to make .38 bullets that can only be used in guns made by one manufacturer. It defies the intent of the framers of the law in the US to presume that you are guilty until proven so, yet this is exactly what DRM is all about, the assumption that all consumers are guilty or would be if given even half a chance.

Besides this, governments should not be propping up business models that are antiquated and broken. Desktop publishing put typesetters out of work, did the governments do anything? Trains put buggy makers out of work, did the governments do anything? That is only naming a couple of examples, but the governments seem hell bent on protecting certain industries. I can only conclude that those same governments are being well paid by those industries, for that is the only logical motivation for such infringements on citizen's liberties and rights.

Now that AACS is cracked, time to follow the money and figure out who is getting paid and expose them as broadly as the DRM keys are exposed.

Re:Released Too Early (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000648)

I think its best to crack it ASAP, the more often and thoroughly it is cracked, the more the industry will start realizing that DRM is costing them more than piracy. Anyways, which is more humorous: MPAA's new ultra uncrackable DRM being cracked before release, and again after release partly, then only a few weeks after that its completely broken a third way; OR MPAA's new ultra uncrackable DRM holding off everyone for YEARS and its finally broken while the next gen format is beginning to phase in?

Now that this has happened..... (1)

8127972 (73495) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000384)

.... Is it not time for the media companies to drop this silly DRM crap? Seriously!

The inherent problem... (5, Insightful)

sco_robinso (749990) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000418)

...As most people know is that you're trying to copy protect an inherently open media format. Even in theory it's very difficult to copy protect media in a widely open, public format.

Until vastly different technology is available 20 or 30 years down the road, all that DRM is going to amount to doing is preventing the 'average joe' from copying en-mass. They just have to make it difficult enough for the casual user to be deterred from copying the content. Look at the copy protection scheme on the iPod - it's basically useless, but it prevents grandma from copying bulk amounts on content. It's like how photocopiers are not a danger to printed media, as it's just 'too' difficult to walk up to a copier and copy things on mass. The industry just has to make it hard enough to deter joe user.

The real problem for the recording industry comes in when now people are getting more and more saavy at copying content, and it's becoming more and more common place, and digital media sharing is now common place and digital media is now common place in the living room now. 10 years ago MP3's were just making there way on the scene and basically only very saavy users knew what an MP3 was, let alone what to do with it. What happens when 10 years from now mobile HD video players are just as common as MP3 players, and your average iPod video has a half a TB of flash storage? Copying (High-Def) DVD's at that point will be common place like MP3's are relatively common place now.

Except that it's not about true piracy (1)

caseih (160668) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000734)

DRM on a disk doesn't actually prevent copying either. It only seems to because you cannot buy blank disks that allow you to write to certain sections of the disk. In theory I could clone the HD-DVD or blu-ray disk bit for bit and produce identical pressed copies en mass. All this DRM does is allow movie companies to continue their questionable practice of price discrimination using artificial region locks and allows the media conglomerates to govern how and when you watch the content, extending copyright artificially.

The Funny Thing (3, Insightful)

s31523 (926314) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000420)

It's funny, the whole DRM thing really seemed to come on strong after Napster was busted. In an effort to thwart the hackers and file sharing people this DRM thing kicked into high gear, yet these groups of people are probably the most savvy and creative buggers out there. The only people this DRM crap will ultimately hurt is the record/movie companies because the average Joe will just get frustrated when his new $40 HD-DVD doesn't play and gives an error of "unauthorized copy" or some crap and go off and not buy stuff any more. The hackers, I am sure, welcome the challenge and probably truly enjoy this cat and mouse game.

Re:The Funny Thing (2, Insightful)

spikedvodka (188722) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000698)

The hackers, I am sure, welcome the challenge and probably truly enjoy this cat and mouse game.
As with any game of cat and mouse... unless the mouse gives up and hides, the cat usually wins.

cat: the hackers
mouse: the media companies

Not Really Broken (5, Informative)

Jah-Wren Ryel (80510) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000448)

The guy just pulled the device keys for windvd and/or powerdvd from system memory. People have already been pulling the volume keys from memory so this was just an incremental step. The keys will be revoked (which really means that future discs will not include support for the compromised device keys, there is no actual 'taking back' of the keys as the word 'revoke' tends to imply).

One key thing to take away from this is that the authors of the software made it really easy to pull the device keys out of memory for two reasons
  1. They kept them in variables that were physically near the variables for the volume key
  2. They zero-ed them out after use, leaving big gaping holes of zeros in memory in a place where that kind of looked funny, drawing attention to those areas
If they are smart (and if the MPAA even give them another chance), the powerdvd/windvd authors will reimplement their AACS decryption code to never store the keys in memory. Without double-checking, I believe the keys are only 128 bits, they could be loaded into the SSE registers in encrypted form and then decrypted on chip. The authors will still need to take measures to prevent an OS context switch from storing the registers in kernel-private memory during the period in which the device keys are present, but that is not an extended period of time, presumably they can kick their priority up high enough that it won't happen without hurting the system much.

Even that approach isn't hack-proof, but it is a lot harder to dump the cpu registers under such conditions than it is to trace memory accesses.

Re:Not Really Broken (1)

Yartrebo (690383) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000724)

Couldn't you still load the program into gdb and get the register values that way? Or is there something in the modern versions of MS Windows that prevents using a debugger?

PS: The last Windows OS that I used regularly was MS Windows ME, so I'm surely out of date with what is going on in that area of computer software.

Re:Not Really Broken (4, Informative)

Jah-Wren Ryel (80510) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000962)

Couldn't you still load the program into gdb and get the register values that way? Or is there something in the modern versions of MS Windows that prevents using a debugger?

Under most versions of unix, only one debugger can attach to a process at a time. So an easy trick to prevent being debugged is to make the program attach to itself, thus locking out other debuggers. Some unices don't let a process attach to itself, but for those it may be possible to fork a child and have each process mutually debug the other. I'm not an NT programmer, but I would bet something along those lines works the same there too.

Don't get me wrong, nothing is fool-proof (and I said so in my first post) the best these guys can do is make it difficult. So far, the windvd/powerdvd guys just wiped the device key from memory after use which is about the bare minimum - they could have done lots more without too much effort.

Re:Not Really Broken (3, Insightful)

spikedvodka (188722) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000730)

Even that approach isn't hack-proof, but it is a lot harder to dump the cpu registers under such conditions than it is to trace memory accesses.
Not really... If you set up a VM, you can pretty much watch the registers. besides, that data has to exist somewhere in some form to get into the register

Re:Not Really Broken (5, Interesting)

TheRaven64 (641858) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000848)

Without double-checking, I believe the keys are only 128 bits, they could be loaded into the SSE registers in encrypted form and then decrypted on chip

Good thing Intel put in those nice debugging registers that let you dump the contents of SSE registers at arbitrary intervals (e.g. after every SSE operation by the debugged process).

Re:Not Really Broken (3, Insightful)

badasscat (563442) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000878)

If they are smart (and if the MPAA even give them another chance), the powerdvd/windvd authors will reimplement their AACS decryption code to never store the keys in memory. Without double-checking, I believe the keys are only 128 bits, they could be loaded into the SSE registers in encrypted form and then decrypted on chip. The authors will still need to take measures to prevent an OS context switch from storing the registers in kernel-private memory during the period in which the device keys are present, but that is not an extended period of time, presumably they can kick their priority up high enough that it won't happen without hurting the system much.

And the solution the Doom9 guys will use to defeat this?

Don't upgrade to the new PowerDVD.

The cat's out of the bag. You can't put it back in now. The new key will be discovered even more easily than the old key, so there's no point even bothering with a key revocation.

Your solution may make some future DRM scheme for a new media format a little more secure, but it's effectively over for AACS.

Re:Not Really Broken (3, Interesting)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000880)

You underestimate the problem:
Lots of media/volume/whatever keys are known.
If a new (Windows XP) player arrives, with new title keys, it's decryption function will create the same output.
All you have to do is to look for that output - and you are near the decryption function. Hiding it registers won't help, you might run Windows XP in an emulator, or you could write a kernel driver that generates an insane amount of interrupts and check from every interrupt.
The only thing that might help is to abandon the idea of
- Windows XP software players
- Windows Vista players that play the movie at all if there is a single piece of untrusted software (debugger, performance logging, whatever) or hardware (RDMA capable nic).
The whole tilt-bit and degrade quality stuff won't help - as far as I see the keys are identical, the degradation happens later.

Let's wait what happens.

Re:Not Really Broken (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000976)

Why were people "pulling the volume keys" I don't know what that means, anyone?

joke is on us (4, Insightful)

circletimessquare (444983) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000450)

yes, we're all laughing because this outcome was obvious to the slashdot crowd years ago. however, the people really laughing are the blokes who sell this drm technology to the MPAA/ RIAA

why laugh at them when you can steal their money?

we need a committee of slashdot readers to compile a list of buzzwords and concerns of the RIAA/ MPAA, and then sell them some technovoodoo that doesn't protect them in any way whatsoever (nothing can, obviously), but continues the RIAA's/ MPAA's illusion that drm can or ever will work

give them their false security blanket, steal their money outright, and then continue to rip them off and drive into extinction the antiquated notion of corporate media distribution channel ownership

they need us, we don't need them. make that point explicit by bleeding them dry via all possible avenues

win win! idiots

look at book publishers... (5, Insightful)

Churla (936633) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000464)

People still buy books, including audio books and eBooks, even though photocopier exist.

I think the recording and motion picture industries need to look at why, and follow that lead. Instead of millions in copy protection R&D, why not spend millions to improve the product? Make the product something people liked owning. (Notice how libophiles obsess over the actual tangible book?).

The one really viable way to control it would be to mandate that all players have an internet connection and it verify the purchaser has rights to the media before playing it. Of course if people have good high speed connections to the internet there's no reason to buy the physical media, which they recording and motion picture industries simply can't abide with.

Here we go again... (4, Interesting)

Synesthesiatic (679680) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000490)

Just like when the iTunes DRM was cracked, I might actually consider buying in these formats now.

And because of that, when I put my iPod shuffle through the wash I was able to replace it with a good AAC-playing MP3 phone and flip the bird to Steve Jobs. Same thing with these...I want my media in formats I can move around and use to my liking.

I'm not going to pay for the same content twice, ever. And if I can't get my content in a cracked DRM or DRM-free format, I'll just pirate it. That'll show 'em.

Re:Here we go again... (1)

stratjakt (596332) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000832)

I agree with you. Suddenly I'm interested in a HD-DVD drive, I could rent^H^H^Hbuy movies, encode them to HD WMV9, fill up a portable HDD and attach it to my 360, or stream across the 'net. (Poor lil fella can't play DivX and it's what's hooked to my HDTV)

This whole "one box contains one movie" thing is so 1980s.

There is no format war, the future is going to be streaming online delivery to secure devices like the Xbox 360. Slashbots will be aghast at my statement, and say "no way will I buy from MSFT, etc". But they will line up around the block to buy the exact same thing from Apple, and there will be a million articles about how new and innovative it is, and how awesome the rules Steve Jobs thought up about how, where and with whom you can watch a movie.

Back to the HDDVD/BluRay disc:

The "protection" is just a lock that you have to pick to get at your media. The action of picking that lock makes you run afoul of the DMCA. The game isnt "make it impossible to hack", the game is "make sure we can prosecute people who do".

This is temporary, ultimately. The polycarbonate disc as a means of delivering digital content will go the way of the dodo. Well, not completely, there will always be collectors. Let's say it'll go the way of the vinyl LP. Forgotten, but not gone.

"Blurred" areas point to secrets (1)

noidentity (188756) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000584)

I also saw that in my "corrupt" memdump the VUK, Vol ID, Media Key and the Title Key MAC were all closely clustered in memory: in the first 50kb (of the entire multi megabyte file!) but there were large empty parts around it. Almost as if it was cleaned up.

Just like Google maps having certain areas blurred, clearing just the sensitive things draws more attention to them. Here it was just a simple matter of going back and finding what was there before it was "blurred".

DRM still helps the DVD consortium (3, Interesting)

u19925 (613350) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000596)

Steve Jobs mentioned that iTunes DRM cannot be shared with others since sharing would compromise the integrity of DRM. The DVD DRM was cracked and now the HD-DVD and Blu-Ray are cracked as well. This doesn't mean that DRM is not helping. Even though, the DRMs are cracked, the DMCA protects these cracked DRM systems and prevents commercial products from taking advantage of the cracks. Without the DRMs (even the broken ones) and DMCA, there would have been cheap legal DVD duplicators in the market.

Let me be the first to say... (1)

sanimalp (965638) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000602)

Thank you to everyone who helped with this project, and thank you to doom9 for giving these guys a home.

This is not a shock (2, Interesting)

stratjakt (596332) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000666)

The very fact that they put any sort of lock on it, means you have to pick that lock to get the content. Getting the content isnt illegal (fair use). Picking a lock is (DMCA). They still have the "legal framework" for pursuing copyright violations.

They'd have stuck with CSS, but to attract new investors they needed a "shiney new more unhackable scheme". It's impossible to implement such a scheme without complete control over all the hardware. But, in the end, the very act of protecting the content is, legally, protection enough.

The only good turnout for "us" (the consumer, fair use advocate, or even casual pirate) is if the industry decides it's not worth it to set the lock in the first place.

There was never a doubt that it'd be possible to extract the data.

[nelsonmuntz] (-1, Redundant)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000700)

HA-Ha!

[/nelsonmuntz]

Books (4, Insightful)

ragtoplvr (1023649) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000728)

We have the ability to copy books. Why do we not do that? Because books are cheap enough that it does not pay. Authors can still make a pile of money. Every other industry has went thru this phase. Content has to get less expensive, executives have to be reduced in number, pay cuts happen, then the industry can grow again. Resorting to DRM in any form, will be unsuccessful because, technology will overcome. The first company to recognize this, restructure appropriately, price appropriately, will win. Same as with book, computers, cars, even washing machines. My .02 Rod

Close (0)

Anonymous Coward | more than 7 years ago | (#18000972)

We don't copy books because books can be purchased for less than the cost of printing our own copy. CDs and DVDs can be stamped out for less than the cost of recordable media. If the **AA would price recorded CDs and DVDs at less than the cost of blank media, then there would be very little unauthorized copying! But then the studios wouldn't have as much money to promote their latest offerings -- hey, buying hookers and coke for DJs and movie critics is expensive!

arms race (4, Interesting)

micromuncher (171881) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000752)

Once upon a time I worked at a company encrypting CDs for digital data. This was over ten years ago... We too had a staged security, weak protection on key store, stronger protection on packages and data. We knew that the cost involved in high security was too high, from a functional and complexity cost POV.

First, making the volume information secure, and file content, was pretty pointless because if you had strong security on it, it would be too slow to do anything useful. For the data, you could wait longer, but at the end of the day, all of it was moot because once either catalog or data is decrypted... its there. So, you decrypt on the fly, or use adaptive methods that attempt to hide information, it all leads to...

The Cost of protection geometrically increases to the linear Time to break it.

And in the end, all the protection does is buy you a little bit of time, because for every couple of guys thinking up the next best protection scheme, once it hits the world, you have 100+* the resources trying to break it.

In the end, the best protection we came up with was something everyone hates... a hardware key that imlpemented the decryption, and sell that key with the media. Economically not viable to copy, but still does nothing once unprotected.

The problem (3, Interesting)

nsayer (86181) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000792)

Everyone talks about the big problem being that you have to give the key to the fellow who's going to watch the movie, but even that understates the difficulties facing DRM schemes.

Recently, I put up a GeoCache puzzle cache. The idea was that folks would have to figure out the puzzle to find out the GPS coordinates of the cache. I was very clever and devious. I was humbled when the thing was found within 6 hours of publication.

How was it done?

To make a long story short, it was a "known plaintext attack." Since I am required to publicize a pair of coordinates somewhere within a couple miles of the cache (to make the geocache site's search engine work correctly - so that folks from New York won't solve the puzzle and get screwed when the cache is 2000 miles away), this lets attackers look for solutions that result in numbers "near" the posted coordinates.

This is what makes movie DRM untenable. Since the format of the disks is publicly known (to insure that UNencrypted disks operate correctly), attackers know that they can discard solutions after decrypting very little of the ciphertext (probably just one byte).

With sufficiently large keys, even that becomes a huge problem, but the fact that the format of the plaintext is known is still a huge advantage for the attackers.

Crack authors please (1)

rbarreira (836272) | more than 7 years ago | (#18000932)

Crack authors, as soon as you get different keys (for different players), include them all in the software. This way, if they want to revoke keys to solve the problem, they'll have to piss off a lot of people by breaking their players, which they won't...
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