Military Pressuring Vendors On IPv6
... and the 'poor planning' simile fits forced IP6 adoption far better than IP4 addy assignment audit/revision across the board.
The OP is right. Many organizations have large IP4 blocks that are not justified or properly utilized. I recently encountered a city hospital (!!) in northern NJ which has a PUBLIC IP4 ip for every floor. Pretty silly and exactly what the OP is talking about. Never mind the old A, B, C type allocations that have been left alone since old post ARPA days. If an organization wants a public IP4 addy, it should get only one and manage it properly. Yes that will take some work, but far easier than IP6 implementation.
The real IP6 motivation appears to be that Big Brother wants to be able to trace all traffic directly to a specific source host, which full IP6 adoption would make possible. IP6 adoption should be resisted by the free world on that principle alone.
Furthermore, you do realize that most IP4 and IP6 stacks are usually implemented separately, right? Considering that the US gov't is evidently still having trouble securing its IP4 based hosts, imagine how it is going to do with the challenge of securing them in an IP6 environment.
Can you say - come in - we are open, wide open, i.e. "Welcome, Chinese hackers..."
White House Unveils Plans For "Trusted Identities In Cyberspace"
More spew from some NoBama pseudogeek.
From the Executive Summary:
"The Identity Ecosystem reduces the risk of exploitation of information by unauthorized access through more robust access control techniques." (pgs 4-5)
If the author is this tentative in the Executive Summary, I don't have much confidence that the result will be anything solid.
Besides, the EFF and such should oppose the imposition of any government identity 'mandates'. I know this draft says that "participation in the Identity Ecosystem is voluntary for both organizations and individuals", but we all know how these things grow up into requirements.
IT Snake Oil — Six Tech Cure-Alls That Went Bunk
Regarding CASE, there were/are a lot of tools mis-labeled as CASE tools.
In order for a CASE tool to deliver, there has to be a sound method behind it. You can tell a poor excuse for one because the marketing hype uses the term "methodology" instead of "method".
The number of people who truly understand software development methods, their history and their benefits and limitations is probably in the hundreds, worldwide. (Hint - they do not include Rumbaugh, Jacobsen and Booch.)
The goal of real CASE and the methods behind it, was to develop zero defect software. This was equivalent to attaining the highest level of SEI CMM, as imperfect as that 'standard' is/was.
What 'killed' CASE use is the money behind UML and Rational and... the tonnes of money to be made from consulting on defective software products. And... a lot of people, who had no idea what methods are, ran around messing up projects left and right saying they were using CASE and 'methodologies'.
Call it the perfect automobile syndrome - the product rarely breaks down and seldom needs replacement. What manufacturer would dare to produce a product that would not require replacement or parts?
So, during the 'CASE' golden era there were a lot of ignorant people touting 'CASE' and now there are some people writing articles about 'CASE'.
Neither type has a clue.
Jobs Not Giving This Year's Macworld Keynote
Just check out the pancreatic cancer survival stats. It's something like 10% survival one year after diagnosis, 4% five years afrer diagnosis. Detection almost always at latter stages when surgery not an option. Very nasty and fast cancer.
Jobs has classic symptoms - wasting away, losing weight.
My own father perished five weeks after diagnosis (stage iv). My father in law died nine months after diagnosis (stage ii).
Schwartz Comments On NSA/Sun OpenSolaris Collaboration
the silly notion that human-reviewed code is somehow safe is a childish fairytale. i don't care how many of you repeat this old wife's tale - it's trivial to prove wrong...
if this were true, we would never ever see a software crash. all it would take is a careful human 'review'.
the dustbin of software system history is quite replete with 'code-reviewed' systems.
the same religious belief drives those who think that they are the only keepers of back doors and that these are so well hidden as to never be discovered by others.
lessee - how many bugs are there in these 'vetted' kernels?